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1ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY:
Rights To Life, Development and Survival
By Reginald Herbold Green
Not only is attacking poverty a moral 
imperative, but it is also essential for 
environmental stewardship.
- World Bank (World Development 
Report 1992)
I.
What Are We Talking About?
Environment and ecology are often used as synonymous terms. This is less 
than helpful if taken to mean that only material conditions and especially 
those relating to nature are relevant to the environment and to 
environmental protection.
Livelihoods (or their absence) are an integral part of the human 
environment. They are an equally integral to the right to development. 
Ecological policy and practice which ignores them is normatively 
problematic. In addition, it is usually unsustainable (especially by 
accountable governments) unless the livelihoods negatively affected are 
those of small, socially and politically marginal communities.
The reconciliation of the right to development and to livelihood with the 
ecological right to survival turns on sustainability. Livelihoods and 
development which are unsustainable are inherently unsatisfactory. 
Sustainable livelihoods and development including ecological management and 
protection does not eliminate conflicts of rights nor the need for trade­
offs and compromises. It does offer a perspective within which dialogue 
and reconciliation more potentially attainable.
"Whose rights to what?" needs posing. Four different answer clusters 
emerge: the rich North, poor Southern countries, poor Southern households 
and persons/groups with focussed general or specific ecological
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- should be important. In practice, it is rarely clearly articulated 
beyond specific cases (e.g. loggers threatened by owl protection).
In the rich Northern perspective global ecological damage threatens both 
future Northern growth and maintenance of achieved levels of income and 
amenity and, therefore, must be halted or reversed. It sees this as 
technically feasible at substantial, but bearable, cost in the North and 
calls on (demands?) the South to carry out a similar exercise out of its 
own resources.
The North's basic interpretation of the global obligation to achieve 
ecological stability/recovery is one of each country being primarily 
responsible for all aspects in its own territory with enforcement (tariffs? 
import bans?) against backsliders. It does - via free trade - propose to 
supply ecologically sound technology to the South, via enterprises and at a 
profit and to undertake relevant research - again primarily via enterprises 
charged for in patented/intellectual property protected legal 
monopoly/oligopoly product prices. On a grace and favour basis some joint 
financing of costs in Southern territory protection is recognised as 
desirable.
The economic logic of this approach is not impeccable. External economies 
(diseconomies) the "beneficiary pays" ("polluter pays") principles do not 
necessarily give territorially bounded results. Further, "ability to pay" 
and "avoidance of regressive taxation" are not principles unknown to 
economics but appear to be almost totally left out of the Northern stance.
The poor Southern country perspective has three strands. The first is a 
root and branch cutting down of the Northern case; the second a defence of 
its own commitment to sustainability; the third a demand for cost sharing 
on a progressive taxation basis. The first basic contention is that most 
past ecological damage and most present risks caused by Northern actions 
(e.g. present comparative CO2 emissions and forest absorptions per capita). 
Linked is the argument that these practices were in large part necessary to 
achieve development and that to forbid them to the South is to forbid 
Southern development. Like its notorious predecessor, the Club of Rome's 
"Limits to Growth" exercise, the North's Rio stance is seen as a "what we 
have we hold" and "the devil take the hindmost" approach seeking to freeze 
global hierarchies and inequalities.
3The second is an assertion that Southern governments are committed to 
environmental protection, even if their priorities are not identical to 
Northern, but are also committed to national sovereignty in identifying, 
articulating and implementing. The implication - sometimes spelled out - 
is that Northern ecologists do not understand Southern environmental 
problems, priorities or policies adequately and they and Northern 
governments are behaving in an unacceptably neo-colonialist mode.
The third is to argue for a common global environmental strategy (including 
Southern priorities) to be financed on a cost sharing basis with charges 
proportional to output per capita and with parallel territorial programmes 
funded on the basis of need. This might or might not be a way forward 
except that the Southern definition of environment tends to embrace the 
whole global economic environment.
Clearly there are links. For example, one cause of ecologically unsound 
resource exploitation is debt servicing. Therefore, debt relief (whether 
broadly linked to national environmental policy or to an agreed project 
package) is discussable. Equally, human poverty leads to the creation of 
ecological poverty so soil conservation/agro forestry/anti-desertification 
packages can reasonably be financed as ecology protecting. But putting the 
whole array of poverty reduction (much less national product per capita 
disparity reduction) under the ecology rubric appears unlikely to be 
functional.
The Southern poor household position is by no means necessarily the same as 
that of Southern governments, especially of relatively unaccountable ones 
responsive to narrow domestic and Northern constituencies, influencers, 
paymasters. Perceptions alter priorities and nowhere in this more true 
than in respect to livelihoods of poor households.
Clearly any Southern poor household 'position' is largely an artificial 
construct. Poor household groupings are usually locally and conceptually 
limited although some national alliances backed by domestic NGO support 
groups with professional expertise are emerging (e.g. India, Philippines, 
Malaysia). Globally, all of their organisational (as opposed to 
individual) spokespersons are voices for, not of, the globally voiceless 
and only on land and the overlapping indigenous minority rights issues have 
these voices tended to focus on items on the ecological agenda.
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cluster of concerns turns on livelihood sustainability and the second on 
access to water, fuel and - at least in densely populated areas — 
sanitation. Perceptions of what is ecologically damaging may be 
'unscientific' (if that is a fair description of observation based on 
reflection on perceived experience) and narrowly bounded both contextually 
and technologically. They are, however, genuine and often acute.
Poor households in general would not deny - and can identify - practices 
conducive to environmental degradation and practices not (or no longer) 
carried out which would reduce environmental damage and future livelihood 
risk. The basic reason for the apparent contradiction between perception 
and practice is need. This perception is not anti-ecological but rather 
ranks survival and a modest sufficiency as the top household environmental 
priorities. If the means to behave in an eco-friendly manner reducing 
livelihood risks consistent with achieving household incomes above a social 
poverty line are made available most such households will respond. How, is 
a complex, contextual problem. For example, many such households are well 
disposed to tree planting - as windbreaks, for fuel and building materials, 
for household fuel and fodder, for cash income - but few welcome large 
mono-tree stands tailored to urban fuel or hillside/watershed conservation 
needs and designed without reference to their livelihood requirements.
Gender aspects of environmental protection certainly do exist. Because 
providing water and fuel are usually among women's responsibilities in poor 
Southern rural households, degradation of tree and bush cover and related 
sinking of the water table have a disproportionately negative impact on 
their workload. Their responsibility for providing food means that soil 
degradation and erosion increase total burdens on their time.
Most women - like most rural people - are aware of the poverty links of 
ecological damage and do seek to prevent ecological looting by outsiders - 
including commercial - forestry endangering food and fuel supply, e.g. in 
Indian and Philippine "tribal" areas. On the other hand, in the context of 
present poverty and narrow survival margins women - like men - necessarily 
choose to put present survival first sometimes with devastating ecological 
results from loss of trees and bushes or soil or both.
These contextual issues are hard to build into a conceptual framework 
albeit a check-list of ecological protection/degradation costs/benefits for
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one now has conceptually is a rather different and rather peculiar 
contention that women in general care about ecology and its protection and 
that men in general do not because women are carers, nurturers, protectors 
and men profiteers, exploiters, users. This transformation of "children, 
kitchen, church" into a positive eco-friendly stereotype is of dubious 
desirability as a means to empowering women or reducing gender typing. 
Operationally it starts at the wrong end by not identifying what 
costs/risks particular women in particular contexts perceive; how they 
believe they could reduce them and what they see as the requirements (time?
money? tools? knowledge?) to do so.
The eco-committed perception focuses on damage and risk on reduction. Like 
any single issue focus, it treats other goals as inherently subordinate - 
though not necessarily invalid or beyond discussion/negotiation. That is
not an inherent objection. If a set of goals and programmes are valid it
is desirable that some people and organisations give them a dynamic and 
cutting edge by focussing on forwarding them. It becomes unhelpful only 
when somewhat extreme (even by general ecological movement standards) 
positions (e.g. viewing tse tse flies as acceptable fauna defenders), 
totally inadequate objective comprehension (e.g. viewing co-existence of 
crocodiles and children in the same body of water as practicable) or 
impervious to other valid goals' claims (e.g. land for food as opposed to 
forests) hamper negotiating attainable trade-offs and/or infuriate persons, 
institutions and countries with other priorities.
A more basic problem relates to risk, cost and temporal urgency evaluation. 
On most issues the direction of negative change is demonstrable. The speed 
and severity is, on known data, much more problematic . So are evaluations 
of costs, degree of positive results, timetables, side effects and 
sometimes even directions of results of proposed changes. The ecologically 
committed tend to underplay uncertainty and pose catastrophic, immediate 
risk scenarios.
Overcertainty/oversimplification of presentation against well briefed 
opponents can lead to loss of credibility rather than agreed initial steps. 
Global warming counter-measures are such that while an early start is 
needed a 'big bang' one is less evidently essential (or attainable). 
Generally it is arguable fear of the consequences of catastrophic risk will
6not mobilise support as well as less apocalyptic, more pragmatic arguments 
(e.g. species diversity protection to yield gene and product banks and 
tourism bases).
The basic issues in each case except perhaps the ecological are power, 
possession and profit. Poor household concerns are to earn a livelihood, 
to have possession of the means to do so (including secure access to usable 
land) and to profit from - inter alia - ecological protection. The 
Northern and Southern governmental cases are even easier to translate into 
p-p-p terms. The ecological stance is about power over what is done and 
possession of the agenda albeit the profit is not material.
That summary is neither denigration nor an epitaph on the possibility for 
action. To possess the means and to have the power to profit from efforts 
to earn a reasonable livelihood whether as a household, an enterprise or a 
country is not merely understandable, it is also laudable so long as 
neither self destructive nor based on impoverishing others.
The present form of presenting perceptions and cases does not appear to be 
particularly well suited to a non-perjorative examination of power- 
principle-possession aimed to seeing how sustainability and livelihood 
(survival/right to development) can be furthered jointly. One clear 
substantive problem area is that of technology to limit emissions damaging 
to the ozone layer and/or contributing to global warming. If existing 
technology is not put into global use and more developed the outlook for 
both ozone and temperature is bleak. But the technology is costly in two 
senses. The first is initial purchase. Enterprises which have invested in 
developing it will - not unreasonably - wish to recover their investment 
and a profit. Cash down purchases at resulting prices may well be beyond 
Southern capacity. Here the parameters of soft loans and regulated prices 
(a normal profit - while hard to define precisely - is one thing; a 
monopoly price entrenched by international intellectual property right 
enforcement is something else) might yield results.
The more serious problem is that of overall capital, operating and unit 
output costs. If these mean Southern industrialisation would - in general 
- be non-competitive domestically and on export markets, means toward an 
acceptable (to the global environment and to the South) way ahead are much 
harder to find. What is needed now is more case by case work on how much 
environmentally friendly technologies would (or would not) raise the costs
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rather specific countries in the South) at a significant disadvantage.
That research is an urgent priority - until more, more objective data is to 
hand serious negotiation, let alone action, will be delayed while 
fluorocarbon and net carbon dioxide emissions continue.
A parallel problem area is institutional. The Rio Conference was not a 
possible negotiating forum, even on principles. The Montreal Convention 
(relating to ozone layer protection) is the product of a workable process 
using specialist and official input to lay the ground for a final 
compromise plus formal unveiling political session. If the commitment 
exists an analogous CO2 Convention could be envisaged (with emission 
control and absorption enhancement provisions).
However, if Southern states (especially the handful likely to have 
emissions seriously affecting the ozone layer or having a substantial 
impact on global warning) are to be added to the Montreal, or included in 
the CO2, Convention work needs to begin now. If the principle of cost 
sharing is agreed then a series of expert studies leading to early official 
level explorations toward parameters of expected contributions and rough 
allocation of transfers (as done in IDA) would be possible. If that could 
be ratified at political level, then how to would - however messy, 
difficult and repeatedly threatened with breakdown - be feasible.
II.
Right To Development; Right To Survival
The right to development is not a codified or convention specified right 
with a legal text. However, several strands have become identifiable in 
the main body of discourse:
■ concern with the right to a decent livelihood for households and 
peoples as well as acceptable levels and growth paths of national and 
territorial output;
■ including participation, access and accountability (empowerment) 
aspects of the human condition as well as the more narrowly material;
■ provision of universal access to basic services (or basic social and 
human investments to use an alternative formulation) both from quality 
of life and quality of productivity/livelihood concerns;
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recognising the need for "safety nets" (as of right) to meet the needs 
of unempowerable persons or households;
■ acceptance that the right to development - like development, however 
defined, can only be met over time measured in decades and, in any 
case, is an ongoing, processual right whose specific content will vary 
(develop) over time.
Nothing in that set of strands is inconsistent with "The Right To 
Survival". Development as processual and attaining an acceptable 
approximation to it requiring decades implies a sustainability requirement. 
A right to development for one generation in terms condemning its posterity 
to the reverse would be a contradiction in terms.
The right to survival is even less codified or the beneficiary of a process 
of dialogue. Discourse has tended to begin from ecological threats to 
survival and to emphasise (or at least demand) immediate technological 
answers with relatively less attention to process, codification or 
institutionalisation. That alarm ringing approach now needs to be 
transformed into a more sober, bureaucratic, institutionalised one. One 
facet of this is clearly negotiations. Another may be building up a body 
of rights which even if not directly legally enforceable - especially 
globally - do have a value in the creation of a body of opinion and of 
expectations conducive to successful negotiation leading to implementation 
including:
■ prevention of global emission levels leading to ecological 
transformations which were substantially life or livelihood 
threatening;
■ similar provisions in respect to regional (e.g. acid rain) national 
(e.g. neo-desertification) and local (e.g. water pollution) ecological 
disintegration menaces;
■ effective access to technologies necessary or conducive to 
preventing/reversing environmental/ecological deterioration;
■ protection of species diversity with managed access and sharing of 
benefits resulting from that access:
■ shared responsibility for achieving results and for meeting costs on a 
basis related to prospective benefits and per capita resources as well 
as physical location of requisite action.
In principle - and in practice over a 50 years perspective - these strands 
are complementary to (in some cases essential for) those of the right to
9development. The areas of conflict are short term and equitable divisions 
of costs/benefits.
The household level short term conflicts turn on: poverty, calamity, 
exclusion.
The poverty conflict is illustrated by many land and labour time poor rural 
households. To live now they must use land intensively in ways leading to 
erosion and/or loss of fertility, collect woodfuel in ways contributing to 
loss of tree/bush cover, curtail erosion avoidance and tree planting in 
order to devote time to immediate payoff activities. Sustainability to 
them necessarily begins with being alive today in order to have a tomorrow, 
even if today's actions erode tomorrow's probable livelihood and certainly 
that of present children as well as unborn descendants.
Calamity impact is illustrated by drought which aggravates the poverty 
position already noted and adds new problems:
■ concentration of populations (human and animal) leading to spot 
environmental degradation which often spreads cancerously;
■ failure to restore damage or to reduce future vulnerability before 
resuming 'normal' use.
Exclusion as a result of measures intended to provide ecological protection 
has affected indigenous minority residents of wildlife protection areas, 
hill peasants and forest clearing cultivators. In a number of cases, the 
ecological gains have not been self-evident (e.g. hunter gatherers in 
African forest zone reserves) nor the motivation above doubt (e.g. 
Philippine approval of EEC backed plantation projects on steep slopes on 
which the indigenous Cordilleran peoples are forbidden to farm). However, 
in others there is little doubt either that existing poor household land 
use was ecological damaging or that the exclusion of those poor households 
was environmentally devastating for them.
Resolution of this conflict can proceed on two lines: preferably enabling 
existing users to practice sustainable activities through altered make-up 
of activities and/or technique changes; or - if the former is impossible - 
providing adequate, acceptable alternative livelihood access (usually
involving land for rural households).
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The same issues arise in rather different forms at national level. Poverty 
can force maximum resource exploitation to earn foreign exchange to cover 
import requirements or to service debt. Equally, it can be seen to require 
using low capital cost technology even if this also means low eco- 
friendliness. Exclusion is even more central nationally if it means not 
harvesting forests nor industrialising using low cost (whether 
environmentally friendly or not) techniques.
Equitable division of costs and benefits is in principle easy to agree. A 
functional comprehensive costing and charging formula, however, is quite 
impossible to agree at political level. The question is what can be 
negotiated product by product, technique by technique, country by country. 
This is messy, tedious and at best approximately correct but there is no 
better option available. At least six points are relevant:
■ most (not all) present ecological damage at global level results from 
the historic and continuing activities of present rich counties at home 
and abroad.
■ if present industrialising countries 'advance' to 1990 OECD output per 
capita levels using 1950-70 OECD technology, ecological collapse is 
inevitable.
■ politically sustainable environmental agendas at national level must 
address domestic (e.g. air pollution, erosion) as well as global (e.g. 
fluorcarbon emission, deforestation) priorities.
■ both external costs (from acid rain to ozone holes) and benefits (from 
additional carbon dioxide absorption to species diversity preservation) 
are common, complex and not readily quantifiable.
■ early action in the right direction is needed both because of 
uncertainty as to how much is required and of the speed of impact.
■ poor countries (and households) even if ultimately benefiting on direct 
discounted future gains flows calculations, may be unable to meet the 
initial capital costs.
That is an adequate base for potential recipients to put up reasoned 
project/programme proposals; for potential transferors to negotiate on 
content and transfer proportion and for a quasi independent expert group to 
put up proposals especially in respect to issues requiring global action 
with suggestions as to territorial distribution of action and national 
distribution of financing including transfer payments and receipts.
Population growth is not directly addressed here for three reasons:
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■ output and technology issues - not population changes - are central in 
respect to the two most immediate global challenges - ozone layer 
holing and global warming.
■ an approach literally targeting reduced population growth as an 
environmental protection instrument would raise serious normative and 
political problems as well as maximising North-South conflict.
■ in respect to both the rural ecological and the poor household 
livelihood issues within the right to sustainable development, the 
causal direction is primarily from poverty to population growth and 
certain types of ecological damage - particularly to trees and shrubs, 
hillsides and land fertility more generally.
Therefore, right to livelihood implementation by, and in support of, poor 
rural households, including universal access to basic services, is the most 
important road to reduced ecological damage from enhanced household/land 
ratios (population growth). Certainly it needs complementary eco-friendly 
technique and family planning programme access, but without the right to 
development focus neither will usually prove particularly effective.
Transforming Conservation into Sustainable Development
Conservation and preservation carry overtones of freezing (or reversing) 
uses. Sustainable development implies the acceptance (or requirement) of 
use changes so long as they do not lead to irreversible ecological or human 
environmental degradation. In some cases sustainability does require 
preservation - e.g. wilderness areas to protect bio-diversity. In others - 
e.g. harvesting fish or trees in a context allowing or providing for 
regeneration - sustainability is compatible with enhanced use. Therefore, 
sustainable development would appear both the more general goal and the one 
to which the broadest coalitions of supporters can be rallied. If this is 
to be achieved, several issues have to be tackled on a case by case, 
contextual basis. Each is contentious but usually in terms of trade-offs 
and compromises which allow for reasoned dialogue, agreed compromise and 
sustainable progress which posing narrow either or positions and engaging 
in a diatribe of the deaf do not.
The first main question is how much of what kind of change is acceptable 
where and under which conditions. In respect of some fragile environments 
virtually none. In other cases - e.g. - use of fluorocarbons - change is 
needed precisely because present use levels are incompatible with 
environmental sustainability. But in many cases more intensive and
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different use is sustainable and seeking to block it environmentally (and 
probably more narrowly ecologically) damaging.
The second basic question is Who pays? When? How? A major issue here is
technology transfer to make non-ecologically/environmentally damaging urban
and industrial development in the South both practicable and cost
efficient. Here the bottom line is not so much normative as that if
Southern industrialising countries in fact halt/reverse use of 
fluorocarbons and release of combustion pollutants then they will need 
technological access at low cost to ways and means of doing so without 
seriously impeding production growth or rendering it significantly higher 
cost.
The Southern case for substantial payments or subsidised transfers has not 
been helped by attempts to use the environment as a beast of burden on 
which to load all transfer payment needs, hopes and desires - as 
exemplified in the South Commission's environmental paper. Fairly clearly 
not all aspects of sustainable development can in practice be financed 
under a globally agreed environmental rubric. A systematic examination of 
types of transfers and of individual cases would seem likely to be more 
fruitful if the richer third of the world is willing to pay a share of 
global/national environmental priority agenda cost equivalent to its share 
of global income (and arguably global benefits from implementation). If it 
is not willing then the global agenda will simply not be achieved whatever 
the rhetoric on any side.
Who benefits? may appear to be a question with the evident answer - 
"almost everyone". But if when? How? When? are appended to it, the 
questions' answers become much less self-evident especially, but not only, 
in the South. For two reasons more attention should be given to 
articulating specific contextual answers.
■ proportions of benefits are at least one component in agreement on cost 
sharing.
■ saleability of environmental measures which entail costs requires 
demonstrating benefits which are immediate and concrete enough to 
convince those who can (and usually will) otherwise block the 
implementation of the environmental agenda. Unless poor people in the 
South see the net effects of proposed changes as positive they are 
likely to block them and certain not to be enthusiastic, self-driven 
implementers. This is not a matter of less concern about ecology and 
sustainability but of concern about livelihood losses (at the extreme
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about survival prospects) in the absence of clearly understood, 
tangible countervailing gains.
III.
Ecology, Economics and Structural Adjustment
Two developments in respect to ecology campaign foci over the past decade 
and especially the past five years are greater stress on economic 
considerations and especially market based "polluter pays" type 
articulations of goals and seeking to tie ecological soundness promotion to 
World Bank lending, in particular to structural adjustment. Both have some 
(quite possibly overestimated) potential but also problematic elements.
Environmental concerns are not wholly ecological and have community, 
national and regional agendas whose long term basic complementarity should 
not be allowed to obscure significant short run tensions and trade-offs. 
Iterative formulations at all three levels with a process of dialogue and 
trade-off to achieve consistency is probably the least unsatisfactory basic 
operating technique. Economics can - to a degree - illuminate present and 
future cost/benefits of trade-offs but it is not particularly helpful at 
creating or sustaining (as opposed to providing part of the content for) 
the bargaining process.
Macro economics and micro natural science are uneasy partners. The first 
deals in broad principles and monetary aggregates from which particular 
micro impacts are deduced. The latter starts with contextual physical data 
and processes and builds up propositions about more general outcomes. At 
present neither has a particularly impressive track record on predicting 
(or dating) environmental outcomes, especially in cases lacking a 
substantial body of historical data and context specific analysis.
Careful application of macro economic principles to specific environmental 
questions usually gives the answer "it all depends". This is not a useless 
answer, if it also specifies what it depends on because that is useful for 
picking out ways of studying specific cases. However, hopes for quick read 
out answers without detailed case by case study are misplaced.
To take an example, lower subsidies on inputs will reduce their usage. In 
the case of chemical fertilisers, the environmental implications almost
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certainly diverge sharply between high fertiliser intensity farming in crop 
surplus areas (e.g Western Europe, North America) and very low fertiliser 
intensity farming in food (and rural livelihood) scarce areas (e.g. African 
household sector agriculture). In the latter case, fertiliser related soil 
and water pollution is low and the practicability of sustainable intensive, 
permanent cultivation without higher than present chemical replacements is 
low. But at present and even more at 2010 household/land ratios that shift 
from long rotation/low input cultivation is a human environmental and an 
ecological necessity. Less fertiliser will frequently mean more soil 
degradation and more deforestation.
Natural science approaches have rather different limitations. Much 
available data is so context specific that its applicability is not 
general. To put it differently, counter intuitive outcomes are not 
infrequent. For example, to concentrate livestock at any one time on a 
small proportion of grazing land would seem intuitively to be a recipe for 
pasture degradation, soil erosion and - perhaps - water table sinking. In 
fact under a controlled, small paddock, frequent rotation system in several 
parts of semi-arid Southern Africa precisely the reverse results: carrying 
capacity is increased, secular pasture improvement set in motion, erosion 
controlled and - less uniformly - water table recovery enhanced. There are 
perfectly standard scientific reasons for this counter-intuitive result, 
but they require study of the specific ecology and ecological dynamics of 
the case, not generalisation from different micro ecological settings.
Designing market mechanisms to articulate/implement policy goals is often 
likely both to be more effective and lower cost than using administrative 
devices. Assuming agreed levels of sulphur emission from power stations 
can be agreed, issuing transferable emission allowance certificates 
together with imposing draconic penalties for over-emission may be the 
optimal available implementation route in Northern industrial economies.
(It is one for which a standard neo-classical micro, and perhaps macro, 
economic case can be constructed.) The danger lies in assuming all issues 
can be dealt with in this way. Some - e.g. catastrophic risk (Bhopal and 
Chernobyl) - cannot. For others - e.g. individual vehicle emission levels 
- pass or fail road-worthiness tests are likely to be more functional than 
graduated licence fees. Markets are means not magicians and are in 
themselves largely eco-neutral or negative.
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The World Bank's role in environmental protection has begun to develop a 
life of its own. Having built up an environmental cadre and put 
environmental audits into many project evaluations, it has provided itself 
with a built-in environmental lobby. However, initially the Bank began to 
pay attention to ecological and human environmental (largely indigenous 
minority rights) issues because Northern and - less frequently but vide the 
Philippines and India - Southern NGOs saw it as an accessible target whose 
funding of major projects gave it substantial environmental leverage which 
it was either neglecting or using in damaging ways.
That was, and is, a remarkable triumph for the environmentalists. Except 
for a handful of country cases in which major funders used all of their 
leverage, the Bank has otherwise been very much a self-accountable band of 
Platonic Guardians (not always in agreement with each other) very 
successfully resistant to outside pressure. But it is a problematic 
achievement if nationally grounded environmental priorities accountable to 
national majorities with human rights safeguards for individuals and 
indigenous minorities are the goals. External NGOs are even less 
accountable to Southern people than Southern governments. The World Bank 
while recognising that only "nationally owned" programmes (in any field) 
are sustainable, finds it remarkably hard to cooperate in their 
construction rather than seeking to ventriloquise them. Massive, intrusive 
conditionality imposed by rich funding bodies (as many NGOs are quick to 
recognise in other contexts) is not a way to mobilise broad, internalised 
Southern support, sustained strategic articulation or whole-hearted 
implementation. A more balanced approach of advice, technological transfer 
(to increase design and implementation capacity), refusal to fund the 
environmentally unsound and - perhaps - a special IDA window (additional to 
normal country 'quotas' or 'ceilings' which do in fact exist even if with 
considerable upward and near total downward flexibility) for financing 
projects directly related to environmental sustainability, vulnerability 
reduction and rehabilitation might generate more securely based progress, 
less suspicion and lower risks of serious conflict.
"Structural Adjustment and Environment" is a linking arising (particularly 
in Sub-Saharan Africa) from the ubiquitous nature of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes and their visible (or to hard line critics naked) impact on 
policy, practice and external resource flows. For the World Bank it is an 
entry point to exert leverage (and to placate its ecological critics?).
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For environmentalists it is a bandwagon to climb on to gain leverage. For 
African negotiators it is an irritating complication that cannot be 
ignored.
Analytically the linkage is usually either fairly marginal or unsound.
Macro economic analysis (the core of structural adjustment design) can 
provide a partial agenda of detailed questions but not read out answers.
It assuredly has little power to identify what new programmes should be 
undertaken based on national ecological and environmental priorities. It 
can - once such an agenda is constructed from the micro up - help evaluate 
economic ways, means, costs and benefits, but that is very different from 
initiating design.
Second, conditionality in Structural Adjustment implies cutoffs of funding 
well beyond rejecting a particular unsound project. Do environmentalists 
seriously wish to halt Ghana's economic recovery through massive withdrawal 
of external transfers to force changes in a forestry policy they do not 
appear to understand and which is arguably sound in principle but grossly 
underfunded? If so, the term "ecolonialism" is rather more than a 
rhetorical epithet - colonialism almost always constructs glosses to 
explain why it 'really' is in the best interests of the colonised.
Actual ecological/environmental content in particular national Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (as opposed to large, freestanding projects) is at 
least in the vast majority of cases, peripheral. Arguably anti- 
poverty/Social Dimensions of Adjustment in some SAPs is an exception. 
However, it is treated purely on a human environmental level and not 
related to ecology in any systematic way.
Initially SAPs had no overt ecological content. Even now the number of 
environmental conditions in Policy Framework Papers (which can run to 50 
pages and 150 conditions) is minute, mostly relating to sustainable forest 
use. There are environmental glosses on (deductive analyses of) some 
country programmes, but these appear to be very much parallel papers after, 
and with minor influence on, strategic formulation. The number of serious 
ground up SAP environmental assessment (ex ante) or audit (ex post) studies 
in SSA still seems to be stuck near zero. In fairness, countries are not 
exactly pressing for more PFP pages or conditions - except in some cases 
(e.g. Mozambique) on the poverty front. But some (e.g. Tanzania) have done 
some environmental assessments and strategy exploration of their own and
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would - if additional funding for articulation and implementation had been 
clearly on offer - have been willing to discuss specific SAP-Environmental 
links.
This is not to say SAPs and PFPs do not have environmental/ecological 
consequences but that they are not consequences resulting from any overall 
strategies or coherent assessments. Ghana forestry illustrates. The Bank 
broadly backs Ghana's long rotation/sustainable replanting approach to 
closed forest management and its use of incentives to enhanced pre-export 
processing to raise export earnings at sustainable cutting levels. It has 
provided some credits which have been crucial to both and is presumably 
willing to evaluate further proposals.
But some forestry sector deductions from its macroeconomic market freeing 
policy are in fact at variance with implementation of the two pronged 
strategy. The Bank has proposed shorter duration logging concessions with 
no right either of first refusal or meeting highest offer at subsequent 
tender for new/extended concessions. Shorter concessions create incentives 
for less selective logging and for doing as little forest 
protection/replanting as possible. So does not giving a firm which has 
protected and replanted either an option to renew or to meet the highest 
bid if new tenders are called at the end of each 25 years period.
The Bank also opposes restraints on raw log exports which Ghana has used to 
limit wasteful cutting of certain species and to encourage sawmilling and 
veneer production. In practice, the Bank has accepted Ghanaian arguments 
but more by turning a blind eye than reaching a formal agreement on guide­
lines.
The conclusions available from a review of economies - ecology and 
structural adjustment are not new nor unique to environmental issues:
■ economic analysis is a useful (but limited) servant but a tyrannical 
master.
■ marrying natural and social scientific analyses and approaches is 
potentially fruitful but usually time consuming and rarely easy.
■ market mechanisms (even in support of non-market goals) may be useful, 
low cost instruments so long as they are perceived as that and no more.
■ while the World Bank should be concerned with ecological/environmental 
issues (especially as they relate to sustained development) it is not a 
plausible proxy World Environmental Adjudication Organisation.
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■ that structural adjustment and environmental protection are both 
important (albeit in rather different ways since the former is 
primarily about medium term means and the latter relates to long term 
ends) does imply mutual recognition and attempts to achieve consistency 
but not that the two should be amalgamated.
■ using overall financial leverage to force policy changes not directly 
related to nor necessary for the effective use of the proposed 
transfers is normatively highly problematic and practically Southern 
animosity generating in potentially counter-productive ways.
IV.
Explorations Toward Sustainable Progress
That ecology is on major agendas is no longer in doubt. That the current 
combination of apocalyptic presentations, separation of human and 'natural' 
environmental issues, diatribes of the deaf and attempted coercive action 
by many parties is a sustainable way to achieve environmental protection 
and rehabilitation is very much in question.
Guide-lines toward a more fruitful set of dialogue and negotiations 
include:
1. Treating ecology as an aspect of environment embracing the human 
(including livelihood and quality of life) aspects as well as the 
natural.
2. Articulating a Right To Survival relating to global emission levels, 
local-national-regional environment disintegration menaces, species 
diversity and shared responsibility over time for rendering the right 
effective.
3. Relating the Right To Survival to Right To Development at local, 
national, regional and global levels via sustainability.
4. Accepting that livelihoods are key to survival and that, therefore, 
ecological protection approaches hostile to present and short run 
household or national livelihood concerns have little chance of 
sustained implementation.
5. Realisation that both priorities (which environmental threats are most 
urgent and damaging) and perspectives (by location and occupation) on
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environmental issues vary legitimately with none having a monopoly of 
normative right or objective wisdom.
6. Acceptance of the fact of uncertainty as well as of that of danger in 
respect to most ecological threats and of the validity of social as 
well as natural science concerns, instruments and processes.
7. Recognition of the realities that the bulk of environmental damage has 
been done by rich countries whose per capita ecologically damaging 
actions (at home and abroad) remain dominant, but also that rapid 
industrialisation without environmental protection in poor countries 
will have massive negative consequences globally as well as nationally.
8. Resulting - given the implausibility (normatively or practicably) of 
halting industrialisation in the South - in a global need to make 
effective, affordable access to eco-friendly technology available in 
both South and North.
9. Moving to the construction from the bottom up of local and national 
environmental agendas to complement top down global and regional ones 
with both processes taking livelihood considerations into account.
10. Creation of sets of negotiating fora based on:
a. acceptance of common environmental concerns;
b. and the need for coordinated actions;
c. including cost sharing transfer payments from richer (and
potentially disproportionately benefiting) to poorer countries and
communities.
11. Initially proceeding in a few global fora - e.g. in respect to ozone 
layer rehabilitation and global warming control - and other regional or 
bilateral ones to achieve early forward momentum.
12. But also seeking to institutionalise the environmental protection 
process including evaluation of threats and instruments to meet them 
and monitoring in order to set guide-lines and contexts for 
negotiations.
13. Based on clear recognition that resource constraints are ecologically 
destructive (e.g. to forest and land at the level of poor households; 
to forest preservation and sustainable management at that of poor
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countries) but that, when resources are deployed to make sustainability 
consistent with improved livelihood in the short as well as the longer 
run, a much broader participation can and does ensue yielding results 
which cannot be achieved simply by proscription and coercion.
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